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KAMAU MUNTASIR,  
a/k/a Faheem, 
                                    Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. No. 09-cr-245) 
District Judge:  Hon. Jose L. Linares 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 14, 2011 
 
Before:   FISHER, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 15, 2011) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Kamau Muntasir, a career offender, pled guilty to possession with intent to 
distribute heroin.  He was sentenced at the bottom of the Guidelines range to 151 months‟ 
imprisonment.  On appeal, Muntasir alleges that the District Court misunderstood the 
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chronology of his rehabilitation and abused its discretion by not giving greater credit to 
his rehabilitative efforts and not departing from the Guidelines range.  Muntasir‟s 
arguments are unpersuasive, and we will uphold the sentence imposed by the District 
Court.   
I. Background 
From 1991 to 2006, Muntasir committed and was incarcerated for several crimes, 
including possession of controlled substances, robbery, attempted criminal possession of 
a weapon and possession of a handgun, and receiving stolen property.  Upon his release 
from prison in March 2006, Muntasir pledged to his mother that he would live a law-
abiding life.  Nevertheless, on October 17 and18, 2006, he was recorded by federal agents 
buying 55 grams of cocaine, 10 bricks of heroin, and various drug packaging and 
preparation items.  In September 2008, Muntasir was arrested for those October 2006 
crimes.   
Between his October 2006 crimes and his September 2008 arrest for them, 
Muntasir endeavored to rehabilitate himself.  He participated in outpatient drug 
treatment.  He was intermittently employed as a contract laborer and sought vocational 
training.  He also volunteered as a mentor in a youth training program and served on the 
host committee for a celebrity‟s April 2008 visit to two local schools.1  That period was 
                                              
1
 Muntasir‟s rehabilitative efforts have continued while incarcerated.  In August 2009, 
he enrolled in a distance learning associates degree program.   
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not free from missteps, however.  Although he was only convicted once of a drug related 
crime during that time,
2
 his long history of illegal drug use continued.  
On April 6, 2009, a federal grand jury indicted Muntasir on two counts: one for 
distribution and possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of cocaine base, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and (b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and another for 
distribution and possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of §§ 841(a)(1) 
and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
3
  Pursuant to an agreement with the government, 
Muntasir pled guilty to the heroin count.  The parties stipulated that Muntasir‟s offense 
involved 16.7 grams of heroin and 35.3 grams of cocaine base.   
At sentencing, the District Court acknowledged receiving and considering the 
presentence report; the original sentencing memorandum; and several other documents 
submitted on Muntasir‟s behalf, including letters from Muntasir, his mother, and 
personnel at some of the organizations with which he had worked after his October 2006 
crimes.  The District Court also heard from Muntasir‟s counsel and Muntasir himself 
regarding Muntasir‟s rehabilitative efforts after those crimes.   
During the sentencing hearing, the District Court stated: 
The defendant has made the argument that he has made aggressive steps 
towards fixing his life of crime and being a contributing member of society 
by mentoring … et cetera.  I get from the statements that were made by his 
own mother and by him in prior sentences, that this is something that he has 
began to do, but has returned to a life of crime. 
                                              
2
 In 2007, after being found in possession of heroin, Muntasir was convicted of 
loitering to obtain controlled substances.  
3
 References are to the 2009 edition of the United States Code. 
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(App. at 28.)  At the prodding of Muntasir, his counsel interjected “[t]he rehabilitation 
things occurred after… .”  (App. at 29.)  Muntasir himself tried to reinforce that 
clarification, which prompted the Court to respond: 
But what I said before was that based on the statements that were made in 
interviews regarding his offense to family members, it seems to be that he 
had begun to make rehabilitative efforts and therefore people were 
surprised when he was arrested again. 
(Id.) 
 Muntasir‟s counsel confirmed that the Court‟s statement was accurate, and then 
Muntasir added: “But the offense occurred before I started doing that, and then they 
arrested me … so I had stopped doing what I was doing for the charge.”  (App. at 29-30.)  
The Court concluded the exchange by stating that it “kind of recounts the whole criminal 
history involved here” and then noting that the rehabilitative efforts Muntasir had brought 
to the Court‟s attention should be considered under 3553 but did not “warrant a departure 
from the otherwise applicable guidelines.”  (App. at 30.)   
Immediately prior to imposing a sentence, the Court again referenced Muntasir‟s 
rehabilitative efforts as well as his hope for continued rehabilitation, and stated that if 
Muntasir “utilize[d] [his] time [in jail] to rehabilitate himself … he [would be] a 
contributing member of society” and “have a future.”  (App. at 32.)  Then, in light of 
Muntasir‟s record, his attempts at rehabilitation, the seriousness of the drugs involved and 
the offense, and the allocution, the Court concluded that, though “some consideration 
should be given to [Muntasir] for his rehabilitative efforts, … a sentence within the 
guidelines [range] is still appropriate.”  (Id.)   
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Muntasir‟s criminal history qualified him as a career offender under 
U.S.S.G.§ 4B1.1.  His total offense level was 29 and his criminal history category was 
VI, which made 151 to 188 months‟ imprisonment the recommended Guidelines range.  
U.S.S.G. § 5(A).  The District Court sentenced Muntasir to 151 months‟ imprisonment.  
He then filed this timely appeal.   
II. Standard of Review4 
We review the District Court‟s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion, 
looking first for procedural error and then examining the sentence for substantive 
reasonableness.  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008).  With 
respect to sentencing-related factual findings, our review for abuse of discretion is 
effectively a review for clear error.  See id. at 217 (“[I]f the asserted procedural error is 
purely factual, our review is highly deferential and we will conclude there has been an 
abuse of discretion only if the district court‟s findings are clearly erroneous.”).  A 
sentence will be upheld as substantively reasonable unless no other reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence for the reasons provided.  United States v. 
Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 770 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. Discussion 
On appeal, Muntasir argues that the previously recounted exchange between the 
Court, himself, and his counsel illustrates that the judge incorrectly understood his 
rehabilitative efforts to have occurred after he was arrested in 2008 for the crimes he 
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 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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committed in 2006, instead of when those efforts actually occurred, which was during the 
period between the crimes and his arrest.  That argument is strained and unavailing.  The 
District Court considered the entire record, was aware of Muntasir‟s rehabilitative efforts, 
and – particularly after the above-quoted colloquy during the sentencing hearing – 
understood the chronology of those efforts as they related to the criminal activity.  The 
record does not evince any confusion undermining the validity of the sentence, a 
sentence, it should be emphasized, that was at the bottom of the Guidelines range despite 
the government‟s recommendation that it be at the top.5  In short, it cannot fairly be said 
that the District Court was operating on a mistake of fact when it pronounced sentence.   
Nor can it be said that the Court abused its discretion in sentencing Muntasir to 
151 months in prison, the bottom of the Guidelines range.  First, the Court carefully read 
the PSR, which details the chronology of Muntasir‟s rehabilitative efforts, including his 
employment, volunteer work, educational pursuits, and participation in drug treatment 
programs.
6
  The Court stated that it took the time to read the documents and to look at the 
photographs provided by Muntasir to demonstrate his rehabilitative efforts, including 
                                              
5
 It should be noted that the statements by the Court that Muntasir challenges are 
accurate.  Muntasir had “begun to make rehabilitative efforts” and people, like his 
mother, “were surprised when he was arrested again.”  (App. at 29.)   Even if the Court‟s 
statements could be read as indicating the Court thought Muntasir had continued criminal 
activity after his 2006 release and after he had begun in earnest to change his ways, that 
too would have been accurate because the record demonstrates that Muntasir continued 
using heroin periodically from September 2007 until September 2008.   
6
 That the Court carefully read the PSR is evidenced both by the Court‟s statement 
that it did so and by the Court‟s comments noting differences between Muntasir‟s 
sentencing memorandum and the PSR, pointing out a mistake in the PSR, and referencing 
Muntasir‟s mother‟s comments in the PSR.  
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those provided on the day of sentencing.  In addition, the Court “listened to what 
[Muntasir] stated to [the] Court, and … to what his counsel had to say.”  (App. at 24.)  
Muntasir‟s allocution included numerous references to his rehabilitative efforts and 
involvement in the community as well as the representation that he had begun rebuilding 
his life “before my arrest, before I even knew my arrest was pending.”  (App. at 19.)  The 
sentence is both within the recommended Guidelines range and reflects a careful and 
reasoned consideration of Muntasir‟s rehabilitative efforts and the seriousness of the 
charges in his case.  Cf. United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 204 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(noting that, though “we do not deem a within-Guidelines sentence presumptively 
reasonable, it is „more likely to be reasonable than one that lies outside the advisory 
guidelines range‟” (quoting United State v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 2006)).   
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order of  the District Court setting 
forth Muntasir‟s sentence. 
